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Abstract
Inferring the intentions of other people from their actions recruits an inferior fronto-parietal action observation network as
well as a putative social network that includes the posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS). However, the functional
dynamics within and among these networks remains unclear. Here we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
and high-density electroencephalogram (EEG), with a repetition suppression design, to assess the spatio-temporal dynamics
of decoding intentions. Suppression of fMRI activity to the repetition of the same intention was observed in inferior frontal
lobe, anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS), and right STS. EEG global field power was reduced with repeated intentions at an
early (starting at 60 ms) and a later (,330 ms) period after the onset of a hand-on-object encounter. Source localization
during these two intervals involved right STS and aIPS regions highly consistent with RS effects observed with fMRI. These
results reveal the dynamic involvement of temporal and parietal networks at multiple stages during the intention decoding
and without a strict segregation of intention decoding between these networks.
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Introduction
Understanding the intentions of other people is a complex
activity that depends on both automatic and reflective interpre-
tations of observed actions. Because the same motor act may lead
to different outcomes, the comprehension of intentions goes
beyond the simple perception of a movement towards an object
[1–3]. Decoding of intentions involves the integration of an agent’s
motor actions [1,3]. In naturalistic situations, as when observing a
person grasping a hairdryer, the comprehension of the action
outcomes depends on the ability to rapidly integrate a dynamic
flow of visual information. This extends from the kinematics of the
person’s hand shaping and recognition of the hairdryer to ‘higher
order’ integrated representations of the meaning and intent of the
action based on the hand-object interaction, such as an evaluation
of whether the actor’s finger is placed on the hairdryer trigger in
order to use it. According to current theories of the organization of
goal directed behaviors, the ability to understand intentions
emerges from a cascade of decoding operations within a
representational hierarchy [3,4]. Recent studies demonstrate that
understanding of intentions is also due in part to the automatic
reactivation of pre-stored templates that have been integrated over
time from one’s own motor skills and life experiences, consistent
with the perspective of embodied cognition [2,3,5–7].
Intention understanding is thought to recruit two functionally
separable cortical networks [3,8]. The first, referred to as the
‘‘action observation network’’ (AON) is located in an inferior
fronto-parietal network (FPN) [3]. Convergent evidence suggests
that the AON is particularly important for integrating sensori-
motor information during perceptual judgments about actions
[9,10], and also for understanding hand-object interactions and
intentions on the basis of embodied cognitive mechanisms
[3,9,11,12]. In addition to the AON, intention understanding
might recruit brain areas involved in social interaction [3]. This
network, now referred to as the ‘‘social-network’’ (SN) includes the
medial prefrontal cortex, precuneate cortex, insula and amygdala
[3]. Both networks include the superior temporal sulcus (STS), and
the region that goes beyond the fundus and the banks of STS; the
superior temporal gyrus, the middle temporal gyrus (MTG), the
part of the angular gyrus that is near the ascending limb of STS
[13–17]. Interestingly, the STS region, notably its posterior part, is
recruited by relatively low level processes such as observation of
biological motion [18], and also higher level operations such as
social inferential processing in tasks requiring mentalizing,
animacy detection and theory of mind [19–21].
Because of the multifunctional role of the temporal cortex areas
involved in both the AON and SN, ongoing debates continue over
the degree to which these networks are functionally dissociable and
whether they temporally interact with one another [3]. There is
parallel debate on the extent to which FPN may be activated with
or without activation of the STS regions [9,22,23]. It is not clear
whether this putative dual-system model of action decoding
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 September 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 9 | e6962operates in serial or parallel and the degree to which recruitment
in these areas is based on automatic or reflective inference about
an action.
To date, the poor temporal resolution of fMRI neuroimaging
has limited the characterization of the temporal dynamics of
intention decoding both within and between these two functional
networks [1,3,4,11,21,24]. Methods using millisecond temporal
resolution, e.g., direct electrophysiological recordings, surface
EEG recordings, or magneto-encephalography hold promise to
unravel the temporal dynamics of action observation and intention
understanding [25,26]. For example, using magneto-encephalog-
raphy during the imitation of lip movements, Nishitani and Hari
(2000) revealed a flow of information from components of the SN
and the AON network over time [27]. However, because this was
an imitation task, it is unclear whether the shift into FPN was a
part of action decoding, working memory or motor preparation.
More recently, Van der Cruyssen et al. tried to specify the
temporal dynamics of decoding action intent by performing an
event related potential study where participants had to decode
action intentions based on the reading of the last word of sentences
describing the behavior of an agent, and from which a specific
intention could be inferred [26]. Because this task was driven by
verbal cues, it remains unclear if the findings would generalize to
the decoding of actions observed visually. Nevertheless, together,
these previous studies demonstrate that it is possible to
characterize the dynamics of action understanding across cortical
regions and that much of the information processing in these two
networks occurs within the first 400 ms. However, the latency of
brain recruitment relative to the action-related stimulus (and
therefore at which processing stage modulation of a brain network
occurs) remains unclear from this prior work. Similarly, the latency
at which brain areas within FPN and STS regions emerge with
respect to one another during intention decoding remains
unknown.
To characterize temporal dynamics in the FPN and STS
regions further, we conducted a motor intention inference task
(IIT; an exemplar of IIT is displayed on Figure 1) combined with
high-density visual event-related potentials (VEPs) and fMRI
recordings from 24 healthy human individuals. During the IIT
task, participants were instructed to attend to a series of 3 s-video-
clips displaying natural hand-on-object actions. Participants were
asked to try to decode, as quickly as possible, ‘‘why’’ actions were
being performed (e.g., to use or to move one of two objects). More
precisely, participants were required to respond within 1000 ms
after hand-object interaction, forcing them to make rapid
judgments with minimal reflective thought. In this way we could
focus on the degree to which intention decoding emerges by
bottom-up processing.
As a diagnostic measure, we used repetition suppression (RS) in
order to avoid the many confounds that commonly emerge from
direct cognitive subtraction between different types of tasks, such as
the decoding of meaningful versus meaningless actions [25]. While
RS has been used in numerous prior fMRI studies [1,4,28–31], to
our knowledge, the present study constitutes the first RS EEG study
on the spatio-temporal dynamics of intention understanding.
The key hypothesis of the current experiment was that both the
FPN and posterior temporal cortical regions (including STS) are
recruited automatically, and thus early in the course of intention
Figure 1. Stimulus sequence and paradigm. A. Sequence of stimuli presentation. Every trial consisted of the following sequence: T0: movie onset,
T1: hand-object interaction followed by T2: end of movie. The example reported here represents a sample of an agent grasping a gun to use it. Task
instruction was the following: ‘‘In this experiment, you will be asked to look at a centred red square during the entire session while trying to guess the
intention of the actor in every video clip once the hand encounters the object (e.g., to use the object or to transport it).’’ B. Repetition suppression
paradigm. Stimuli were presented in a mixed event-related/block design, with repetition suppression (RS) effects of intention (to transport vs. to use)
and object (gun vs. hairdryer) examined within blocks. The example reported here represents a sample of an RS effect (in yellow for suppression and
red for activation) that may occur on object goal (i.e., the use or WHAT) or action goal (i.e., the intention or WHY).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006962.g001
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based on the sensitivity of both fMRI and event-related potential
measurements to RS at the level of what was being intended by an
agent and not by the specific object that was being grasped.
Results
Behavioral results
Accuracy. No main effect of judging the type of intention was
observed (P .0.05). On the other hand, a significant interaction
was observed between intention and object types (F(1,23)=111.12;
P ,0.0001), suggesting that the stimuli are better recognized when
they are meant to be used as guns that can be fired or when they
are meant to be transported as hairdryers (Table S1). In line with
classic RS effects, the present RS paradigm revealed higher
accuracy rates for repeated intentions (72%) than for new
intentions (58%; F(1,23)=213.86; P ,0.0001; Figure 2A,
Table 1). The high error rates confirm that participants had
minimal time for explicit analysis before responding.
Reaction times. A main effect of intention type was observed
F(1,23)=38.05; P,0.0001), suggesting that ‘‘utilization’’
intentions (582 ms) were faster recognized than ‘‘transport’’
intentions (634 ms; Table 1). A significant main RS effect was
observed for intentions across types (F(1,23)=18.75; P,0.0004),
suggesting that new intentions (567 ms) are recognized faster than
repeated intentions (649 ms). The reaction time results establish
that participants were well engaged in the task. The pattern of
reaction time results rules out the possibility that the fMRI and
EEG RS effects were due to decreasing time spent processing the
stimuli on task (and shorter reaction times) for repeated items.
NeuroImaging Results for New versus Repeated
Intentions
Functional MRI results. Functional MRI results revealed
significant RS in bilateral aIPS, right STS, inferior parietal lobule,
and left inferior frontal gyrus when participants saw new intentions
versus repeated intentions (Figure 3; Table 2). Other weaker
activations were present in the superior and medial frontal gyrus,
and left temporo-occipital region (Table 2). These regions did not
show significant RS effects for the specific object that was grasped,
(Supporting Information S1; Table S2). These findings establish
the sensitivity and specificity of both posterior temporal and FPN
to action decoding at the level of intentions.
EEG neuroimaging results. High-density EEG neuro-
imaging, combining brain microstate analysis with Local
Auto-Regressive Average (LAURA) distributed linear source
estimations, expanded these fMRI results by revealing the
temporal dynamics of new intentions as compared to repeated
intentions (Figure 4A–D). For the new intention (NI) condition, the
brain microstate analysis revealed a total of six time periods of
stability (i.e., New Intention-Map (NI-Map) 1: 0–30 ms; NI-Map
2: 32–60 ms; NI-Map 3: 62–130 ms; NI-Map 3: 132–200 ms; NI-
Map 4: 202–330 ms; NI-Map 4: 332–400 ms; Figure 4B). For the
Figure 2. Behavioral results for intentions. A. Accuracy. Percent-
ages of accuracy are shown for every type of intentions (NI: new
intentions; RI: repeated intentions; NU: new utilization; RU: repeated
utilization; NT: new transport; RT: repeated transport). Accuracy was
higher for repeated intentions (72%) than for new intentions (58%).
Although no main effect of intention type or object was observed
(P.0.05), a significant interaction was observed between intention and
object types (F(1,23)=111.12). A significant interaction was also
observed between intention and object types as a function of RS
effects (F(1,23)=33.3; P,0.0001), suggesting that stimuli were better
recognized when both intentions were repeated as opposed to either
being new. Results are reported at the P,0.001 level. B. Reaction times.
Reaction times (in millisecond) are shown for every type of intentions
(NI: new intentions; RI: repeated intentions; NU: new utilization; RU:
repeated utilization; NT: new transport; RT: repeated transport). A
significant main RS effect was observed for intentions across types
(F(1,23)=18.75; P,0.0004), suggesting that new intentions (567 ms) are
faster recognized than repeated intentions (649 ms). Results are
reported at the P,0.001 level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006962.g002
Table 1. Reaction times and accuracy: performance measures
across types of intentions (new vs. repeated).
Reaction times % Accuracy
Mean (ms) (S.E.) Mean (%) (S.E.)
Intention type
Utilization 582 65
New 543 (13.36) 56 (.38)
Repeated 620 (13.28) 73 (.33)
Transport 634 66
New 591 (12.02) 59 (.39)
Repeated 677 (11.51) 72 (.35)
New 567 58
Repeated 649 72
All ANOVAs had a level of significance set to 0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006962.t001
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only four time periods of stability were detected (i.e., Repeated
Intention-Map (RI-map) 1: 0–30 ms; RI-Map 2: 32–100 ms; RI-
Map 3: 102–240 ms; RI-Map 4: 242–400 ms; Figure 4D). The
main differences between the NI and RI conditions were observed
at two different time periods after hand-on-object interaction: the
first occurred between 62 and 130 ms; the second difference
occurred between 332 and 400 ms post hand-on-object interaction
(Figure 4). The first temporal difference (between 62 and 130 ms)
was reinforced by a significant global field power (GFP) difference
between NI (in red in Figure 4A) and RI (in black in Figure 4A)
during this time period. More precisely, the GFP peaked at
126 ms for novel intentions, although group-averaged GFP for the
repeated intention condition was almost extinguished at the same
time period (P,0.05). The reliability of this difference observed at
the group-averaged level was confirmed at the individual level
using a Bonferroni corrected paired t-test on GFP (significant
greater GFP difference for novel intentions in comparison with
repeated intentions from 118 ms to 134 ms, with a peak at
126 ms; t=2.71; P=0.013). No GFP difference was observed for
the second time period, suggesting that, at this time, the two
conditions varied as a function of topography rather than power.
LAURA source estimations of the topography of these two
significant periods of stability revealed similarities with our fMRI
data by showing a distributed network mostly characterized by
right-lateralized activations including right STS (local maximum:
right posterior STS: 60, 237, 7; x, y, z mm Talairach coordinates)
and bilateral aIPS (local maximum: right aIPS: 39, 237, 54; x, y, z
mm Talairach coordinates; Figure 4B) for the first significant time
period, and the recruitment of a distributed brain network, mostly
in the left aIPS (local maximum: 240, 243, 48; x, y, z mm
Talairach coordinates), right MTG/STS (local maximum: 253,
255, 17; x, y, z mm Talairach coordinates), left inferior frontal
gyrus (local maximum: 248, 33, 23; x, y, z mm Talairach
Figure 3. fMRI neuroimaging results for intentions. Functional MRI results when participants saw repeated actions with the same intentions
(action goals). RS was observed in the following areas. Top panel: right MTG/STS (46,261,12 x, y, z MNI coordinates; Z: 4.12), Middle panel: bilateral
aIPS (left: 232,254,41 x, y, z MNI coordinates; Z value: 3.3; right: 38,253,41 x, y, z MNI coordinates; Z value: 3.45). Bottom panel: left inferior frontal
gyrus (241,30,22 x, y, z MNI coordinates; Z value: 3.47). Weaker areas are reported in Table 2. BOLD responses are shown on axial views.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006962.g003
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Other weaker activations are reported in Table 3. Outside of these
two time windows of difference, LAURA brain source estimation
revealed similar topographies and brain source estimations for
both the NI and RI conditions (Figure 4C). These brain source
estimations were localized within anterior MTG/STS, bilateral
occipital region, temporal occipital cortex, and anterior cingulate
(Table 3). Microstate analysis for novel versus repeated objects
demonstrated a different sequence of brain sources (including the
following current source maxima: occipito-parietal, left anterior
temporal lobe, anterior cingulate, right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG),
and right anterior temporal lobe; see Supporting Information S1;
Table S3, Figure S1 and Figure S2), confirming that the RS
differences for intention decoding described above were both
temporally and spatially specific.
Discussion
The ability by fMRI to distinguish dual systems for intention
understanding, i.e., one distributed across fronto-parietal cortex and
incorporating the putative human mirror neuron system [9,32] and
another more broadly distributed ‘‘social network’’ has led to strong
arguments about their relative importance, functional independence
and specificity [24,33]. On the one hand, it has been argued that the
AON is sufficient for decoding all intentions and more generally
social reasoning via mirror neuron mechanisms [9]. On the other
hand, a strong case has been made that processing related to
inference is conducted within the SN alone [20,21]. By combining
event-related fMRI and high-density EEG recordings with a
repetition suppression approach, here we could address this problem
more directly and test for evidence of automatic early recruitment
across these networks in an intention understanding task.
Behavioral performance and intention understanding
In line with prior behavioral studies of adaptation, repeated
intentions were identified more accurately (72%) than new
intentions (58%). These behavioral findings confirm the existence
of different neural processes between new and repeated trials during
intention understanding. A significant adaptation effect was also
observed for speed of decoding intentions as ascertained by reaction
times, which showed faster intention decision making for new
(567 ms) versus repeated intentions (649 ms). This opposite pattern
of behavioural performance (i.e., slower reaction times for decoding
repeated intentions) is in line withprevious work demonstrating that
behavioural attenuation effects (rather than priming effects) may
occur as a function of the task instruction [34]. Also, the pattern of
reactiontime results rulesoutthepossibilitythat the fMRI and EEG
RS effects were due to decreasing time spent processing the stimuli
on task (and shorter reaction times) for repeated items. Interestingly
previous studies have shown that behavioural adaptation may
reflect stimulus-specific processing independent of task demands
ratherthana reduced processing time[34].Inthepresentstudy,this
suggests that a specific neural network implying automatic analysis
of repeated versus new information may be engaged during
intention understanding.
fMRI localization for intention understanding
By using RS with fMRI we identified a specific subset of brain
regions within both the human AON and SN that are specifically
sensitive to intention understanding. Despite the uncertainties
about the neural mechanisms underlying RS, i.e., ‘‘fMRI
adaptation’’ [28,34–37], our data are in line with the principle
that the number of neurons that are important for stimulus
representation and processing remain constant but show reduc-
tions in their firing rates or duration of firing for repeated stimuli
[28,36]. In agreement, the present fMRI RS results revealed a
systematic increase of activation in the right MTG/STS, inferior
parietal lobule (IPL), aIPS, and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) in
response to the presentation of new intentions as opposed to
repeated intentions. The occurrence of RS effects in heteromodal
cortex reinforces the evidence that RS occurs across the neocortex
and is not limited to only low level areas such as the visual cortex.
This highlights the growing potential of using stimulus-specific RS
effects to study cognitive operations beyond basic perceptual
features. In our data, the specific functional dynamic for decoding
intentions was different than that for decoding lower level visual
features related to the specific object that was grasped (Supporting
Information S1). The network for understanding intentions
extends beyond brain areas involved in object shape, size, and
orientation (e.g., ventral visual areas).
The present findings reinforce previous work showing a
recruitment of IPL and IPS for hand action observation and goal
representation [18,21,38,39]. Current human data reinforce a
growing body of studies which demonstrate a strong role of aIPS in
goal and outcome understanding and so challenge the classic view
suggesting that aIPS acts as a repository of grip apertures
generated from object features [3].
Another key finding from the current fMRI RS results is the
sensitivity to intention in the STS. This reinforces the critical role
of the STS in action interpretation [18,21]. The current fMRI task
design and temporal resolution does not allow us to make any
conclusions whether this STS sensitivity involves more complex
inferential processes such as mentalizing or theory of mind
[19–21]. However, the results of the present study suggest this
region, in conjunction with aIPS, might be involved in decoding
intentions at the earliest stages of action recognition.
The involvement of the inferior frontal gyrus, a brain region
involved in cognitive functions such as planning and performing
action, reinforces recent evidence demonstrating a crucial role of this
b r a i na r e ai ni n t e n t i o nu n d e r s t a nding [11,40]. In support of this,
lesions circumscribed to IFG have been associated with deficits in
matching pictures of actions with appropriate objects. Also, recent
virtual lesion studies based on transcranial magnetic stimulations to
Table 2. Local Maxima in MNI coordinates of cerebral
activations peaks from fMRI data for new intentions minus
repeated intentions.
Brain region labels x y z Z Cluster size
MTG/STS 46 261 12 4.12 104
IPL 250 232 45 3.88 67
42 241 45 3.38 49
IPL/aIPS 38 253 41 3.45 50
232 254 41 3.3 101
Temporo-occipital cortex 238 274 11 3.74 29
Superior frontal gyrus 23 15 49 3.70 162
Inferior frontal gyrus 241 30 22 3.47 53
Superior frontal sulcus 234 214 55 3.45 61
IFG 250 6 30 3.2 18
Local maxima, with a Z values greater than 3 in each cluster, are provided in the
table. Cluster size is in voxels. When the cluster encompasses more than one
anatomical location, the localization given corresponds to the local maxima
with the highest value. P,0.005 uncorrected.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006962.t002
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increased response times in matching tasks that involve body actions.
Temporal dynamics of intention understanding
Our EEG findings identify modulation in the temporal dynamics
of intention understanding by demonstrating two time intervals with
sensitivity to RS across the collective 400 ms after hand-object
interaction onset. The present data arealsoin line with previous work
showing early and/or late repetition effects as indexed with visual
event-related potentials (VEPs). Previous work has also demonstrated
that RS effects for higher-order cognitive mechanisms can emerge as
early as 75 ms after stimulus onset and then around 400 ms [37,41].
Early and late RS effects have also been described in studies of object
vision [37]. Our results identify an early RS effect between 62 and
130 ms after grip onset; and also a later one around 330 ms. This
very earlychange inthe GFP showsthat when observing actionsdone
Figure 4. Electrical neuroimaging results for intentions. A. Schematic representation of the global field power for new intentions (NI; in red)
and repeated intentions (RI; in black) from T1 to 400 ms post-T1. B. The microstate analysis identified a total of six time periods of stability for NI. NI-
Map 1: 0–30 ms; NI-Map 2: 32–60 ms; NI-Map 3: 62–130 ms; NI-Map 3: 132–200 ms; NI-Map 4: 202–330 ms; NI-Map 4: 332–400 ms. For the RI, only
four time periods of stability were detected, i.e., RI-map 1: 0–30 ms; RI-Map 2: 32–100 ms; RI-Map 3: 102–240 ms; RI-Map 4: 242–400 ms. The main
differences between NI and RI conditions were observed at two different time intervals: i) between 62 and 130 ms; and ii) between 332 and 400 ms
post hand-on-object interaction. Here, maps are represented on top of schematic representation of GFP. All topographies are shown with the nasion
upward and left scalp leftward. LAURA source estimations of these two intervals were characterized by right-lateralized activations including right STS
(local maximum: right posterior STS: 60,237,7; x, y, z mm Talairach coordinates) and bilateral aIPS (local maximum: right aIPS: 39,237,54; x, y, z mm
Talairach coordinates) for the first interval, and the recruitment of a distributed brain network, mostly in the left aIPS (local maximum: 240,243,48; x,
y, z mm Talairach coordinates), right MTG/STS (local maximum: 253,255,17; x, y, z mm Talairach coordinates), left IFG (local maximum: 248,33,23; x,
y, z mm Talairach coordinates) for the second interval. Differential activations between NI (B) and RI (D) are represented on top of the schematic
representation of the GFP. C. Common LAURA brain source estimations for both NI and RI conditions are shown here. These brain source estimations
were localized within anterior MTG/STS, bilateral occipital region, temporo-occipital region, and anterior cingulate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006962.g004
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intention of an action (e.g., to hold a gun to shoot) in an early stage of
visual processing, i.e., after only 62–130 ms.
The evidence of early differences in visual processing for action
intentions after hand-object interaction suggests participants are
generating automatic judgments about observed intentions. This is
further supported by our behavioral results. The accuracy rates
were low during imaging (e.g., around 60% for novel intentions)
due to the temporal constraint imposed in the IIT task. This
interpretation that participants only had time for rapid judgments
is further supported by the high accuracy rate (100%) we obtained
from the participants when they had no time constraints during
the debriefing session. i.e., when participants had time to make
explicit and slower inferential judgments on intentions (See
Supporting Information S1).
Spatiotemporal Dynamics of Intention Understanding
Source estimations of the RS sensitivity to intention support a
two stage-process model by showing modulation of activity in
different cortical networks as a function of time. Critically, these
estimations show a significant recruitment within right STS and
bilateral aIPS in the early stage of information processing,
beginning shortly after the start of the hand-object interaction.
The EEG sources for these early RS effects as indexed by VEPs
are anatomically consistent with the localization of RS effects
obtained in our BOLD fMRI analysis. In both cases the areas are
distinct from those for RS of object or other lower kinematic
features. This supports a relative hierarchical model of action
understanding, with nested levels of information processing
distributed across cortex [3,42]. The presence of recruitment in
STS and aIPS early in visual processing data are also in line with
recent electrophysiological evidence from both animal and human
studies arguing for a bidirectional mechanism where these
associative areas can be recruited in very early stages of
information processing (,60 ms) [43]. Along these lines, the early
visual evoked potentials (VEPs) in associative areas in our study
may not be exclusively generated by sensory activation but might
also be generated by input from higher-order areas amplifying the
decoding of intention relevant features. A later stage of intention
specific information processing was observed in a more widely
distributed posterior right temporal region and left aIPS network,
with an additional involvement of left inferior frontal gyrus.
Together, the intention specific adaptation observed at these two
stages indicates that right STS and aIPS regions do not simply
function as part of a serial, unidirectional network. Instead, our
findings suggest the repeated involvement of STS and aIPS as
observers engage in the process of decoding the intentions of other
people. The spatio-temporal dynamics of intention decoding provided
by the EEG and source localization methods used in the present study
substantially supplement the results observed in the fMRI RS data.
While the pattern of intention specific fMRI RS is remarkably
consistent with the source estimates of RS EEG, the former presents
only a static picture of what is a highly dynamic process.
Methods
Population
Twenty-four men ranging from 19–42 yrs in age participated in
the present study. All were right-handed with normal (or corrected)
vision,andnopsychiatricorneurologicaldiseases,asascertainedwith
a detailed anamnesis. All participants gave their informed written
consent to take part in the study that has been approved by the
University of California Santa Barbara’s Institutional Review Board.
Procedure
We used a repetition suppression paradigm in an event-related
experiment. Participants were asked to perform a motor intention
inference task while the experimenter monitored their perfor-




Microstate time periods for
repeated intentions Brain region labels x y z
0–30 ms 0–30 ms left MTG 253 228
32–60 ms 32–100 ms Left inferior frontal gyrus 242 27 1
62–130 ms
* - Right STS region 60 237 7
Right aIPS 39 237 54
Occipital lobe 3 282 6
Right medial frontal gyrus 27 55 13
Anterior cingulated 3 35 210
Left MTG/STS 248 263 15
Left MTG 258 211 29
132–200 ms 102–240 ms Left MTG 253 211 29
202–330 ms 242–400 ms Right MTG 53 26 29
332–400 ms
* - Left IPL/aIPS 240 243 48
Right STS region 53 255 17
Right MTG 60 226 26
Left MTG 253 26 29
Left IFG 248 33 23
Local maxima (in Talairach coordinates) of periods of brain stability (i.e., microstates) are provided in the table. Asterisks indicate time periods that are significantly
present in the novel intention condition in comparison with the repeated intention condition. P,0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006962.t003
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performed both in EEG and fMRI, i.e., two sessions a day apart
from one another.
Stimuli material
A total of 32 sets of 3 second-long action video clips were
generated. Each video clip depicted a hand reaching out to either
transport or use a hairdryer or a gun (e.g., Figure 1; video S1, video
S2). Every video clip consisted of the following sequence: T0: movie
onset,T1:hand-objectinteraction followed byT2:endofmovie.T0
consisted in an establishing scene with one object (a gun or a
hairdryer) on a green background. The gun and the hairdryer were
placed on the green background at equal distance on either side of
the center of the video frame. Video clips were recorded with non-
directional lighting against a green background to enable later
editing of the stimuli with video software. The video camera was
positioned on a tripod and angled downward to capture the arm
and hand reaching for the target from a third person perspective
(approx. 45 degrees from the horizontal plane of the desktop). All
video clips were created by filming intentional natural actions on an
object. Five hundred milliseconds after T0, the actor’s hand was
required to approach the object with a controlled speed and
controlled hand aperture that was similar for every condition. At
T1, i.e., after about 1200 ms after T0, the actor’s hand grasped the
object. Two types of intentions were manipulated: To use or to
move an object. The position of the object (right visual field, left
visual field),thetarget object(gun,hairdryer),the actinghand (right,
left), the direction the object was facing (right, left) and the
kinematics of the grip (overhand, underhand) were controlled and
alternated over 32 video clips. The conjunction of acting hand,
direction the object was facing, and kinematics of the grip
determined if an action reflected a utilization grasp (e.g., right
hand + underhand + left-facing object) or a transport grasp (e.g.,
right hand + underhand + right-facing object). The wide variety of
stimuli meant that we could be confident that the results revealed a
general neural representation of intention understanding, rather
than being an epiphenomenon of one particular type of video clip.
Each reach to grasp was completed and edited to exactly 3-second
segments using video editing software Adobe Premiere Pro 2.0
(Adobe Systems, San Jose, CA). T2 corresponded to the end of T1
(Figure 1). Reaction times were collected from T1.
Task Instruction
‘‘In this experiment, you will be asked to look at a centred red
square during the entire session while trying to guess, as quick as
possible, the intention of the actor in every video clip once the
hand encounters the object (e.g., to use the object or to move it).’’
Experimental design
Participants viewed sequences of video clips separated by a
blank screen. In order to avoid any saccadic movements, a fixation
red square remained constantly on the screen (Figure 1A). After a
sequence of eight video clips, a 6 s-long screen reminding the task
instruction was systematically presented. Each sequence of eight
movies began with a randomly chosen video clip designated as
being novel. The subsequent video clips were chosen among the
remaining set of video clips according to a pseudo-random order.
Novel and repeated trials were defined in relation to the previous
trial only (Figure 1B). Each participant completed five runs with 8
sequences in each run, giving a total of 64 trials per run.
Experimental blocks were intermixed for every participant. The
same event-related design was used in both fMRI and EEG
session. Inter-trial interval varied in 2000 ms random increments
from 2000 to 6000 ms.
Repetition Suppression Procedure
Stimuli were presented in a mixed event-related/block design,
with repetition suppression (RS) effects of intention (to move vs. to
use) and object (gun vs. hairdryer) examined within blocks. In this
IIT, the stimuli were arranged so that different aspects of the
observed motor action were repeated from trial to trial. In parallel
we tested for concomitant suppression of brain activity [28,44].
More precisely, in the current experiment, the position of the two
objects, which object was grasped, how the objects were grasped
(underhand or overhand grip) and why it was grasped (to transport
or to use) were independently manipulated. The two objects in
each trial were closely paired in terms of size, color, and shape, so
that grasp configuration was similar (Figure 1). In this way,
repetition of intention could be separated from other kinematic
aspects of hand-object interactions. The order of presentation of
each block was randomized across participants. Within each block,
the trial order of stimulus repetition was pseudo-randomized by
initially randomly drawing the first video-clip to be presented as
novel. The order of the eight movies that followed came from one
of eight pre-determined trial sequences that ensured two
repetitions of each combination of object (gun, hairdryer) and
intention (transport, utilization) within each block. This RS
procedure allows to characterize the temporal dynamics within
brain networks that are sensitive to the intentions of an action and
distinguish these from lower level stimulus features [3].
Data acquisition
Both functional (fMRI) and electrical (VEPs) neuroimaging
were conducted at the University California Santa Barbara Brain
Imaging Center.
fMRI data acquisition. Functional MRI recordings were
conducted using a 3T TIM Trio Siemens Magnetom with a 12
channel phased-array head coil. Foam padding was used for head
stabilization. For each functional run, an echo planar gradient-
echo imaging sequence sensitive to BOLD contrast was used to
acquire 33 slices per repetition time (TR) (3 mm thickness), with a
TR of 2000 ms, echo time of 30 ms, flip angle of 90 degrees, field
of view of 192 mm, and 64664 matrix. Before all the functional
runs, a high-resolution T1-weighted sagittal sequence image of the
whole brain was acquired (TR=15.0 ms; echo time=4.2 ms; flip
angle=9 degrees, 3-D acquisition, field of view=256 mm; slice
thickness=0.89 mm, matrix=2566256).
VEP data acquisition. Continuous electroencephalogram
(EEG) was recorded from 128 AgCl carbon-fiber coated electrodes
using an Electric Geodesic Sensor NetH (GSN300; Electrical
Geodesic Inc., Oregon; http://www.egi.com/), where EEG
electrodes are arrayed in a regular distribution across the head
surface and the inter sensor distance is approximately 3 cm. The
EEG was sampled at a rate of 500 Hz, and band-pass filtered at
0.01–200 Hz with the vertex electrode (Cz) serving as an on-line
recording reference. Impedance was kept below 50 kV.
Data analysis
fMRI data analyses. Functional MRI analysis was carried
out in SPM5 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Data were realigned to
correct for head movements. All realigned functional images were
registered to the anatomical image. The anatomical images were
then transformed to conform the Montreal National Institute
(MNI) space and the parameters of this transformation were
applied to the functional data and smoothed with an 8-mm full
width half maximum filter. A design matrix was fitted for each
subject with the trials in each cell of the 26262626262 factorial
design (intention types (to use vs. to move); objects (gun vs.
hairdryer); presentation types (new vs. repeated); position of object
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vs. over), hand of action (left vs. right)), modeled by a standard
hemodynamic response function and its temporal derivative. Each
trial was modeled as a single event, starting at the onset of the
hand-on-object interaction. Rest was not modeled. The design
matrix was fit to the data for each participant individually. After
estimation, betas were taken to the second level for random effect
analysis to identify which brain areas were preferentially activated
novel intentions in comparison with repeated intentions (novel
intentions . repeated intentions). Anatomical labeling was
ascertained by the probabilistic brain atlas from the Laboratory
Of NeuroImaging at the University of California Los Angeles.
This atlas provides a series of maps of brain anatomic regions, that
were produced from a set of whole-head MRI of 40 human
volunteers, and which includes a set of 56 structures in the brain.
VEP data analyses. Continuous electroencephalogram
(EEG) data were imported, averaged and analyzed in Cartool
(version 3.32). Epochs of analysis were visually inspected for
oculomotor (saccades, and blinks), muscles, and other artifacts in
addition to an automated threshold rejection criterion of 100 mV.
After off-line artifact rejections, VEPs were computed covering
400 ms after the onset of hand-on-object interaction. This 400 ms
time window of analysis was based on previous studies that showed
temporal modulations of action and intention decoding within the
first 400 ms of information processing [40]. VEP data were then
baseline corrected, and band-pass filtered between 1 and 30 Hz.
VEP data were then recalculated off-line against the average
reference, and normalized to their mean global field power (i.e.,
GFP) before group averaging. The GFP, computed as the spatial
standard deviation of the scalp electric field, yields larger values for
stronger electric fields and is calculated as the square root of the
mean of the squared value recorded at each electrode (vs. the
average reference).
Microstate analysis. VEPs data from novel and repeated
intentions were then submitted to a brain microstate analysis in
order to detect every period of brain state stability (microstate)
after hand-on-object interaction [45]. To identify start and end of
each optimal microstate, a standard cluster analysis was employed
using the grand-mean VEPs of each condition [45,46]. This
cluster analysis uses a hierarchical agglomerative cluster-algorithm
to identify the predominant topographies (i.e., maps) and their
sequence within a data set. The optimal number of maps (i.e., the
minimal number of maps that best accounts for the data set) is
determined based on a modified Krzanowski-Lai criterion [47].
Importantly, this cluster analysis is reference-free, and insensitive
to amplitude modulation of the same scalp potential field across
conditions, since normalized maps are compared. It was
performed across time and experimental conditions in order to
determine whether and when novel versus repeated intentions
engaged distinct configurations of intracranial generators. Then,
the pattern of maps observed in the group-averaged data was
statistically tested at the individual level using a competitive fitting
procedure that determines whether a given experimental condition
is more often described by one map versus another. Durations of
every period of brain stability (microstate) were subjected to a
repeated measure ANOVA. Results were accepted as significant at
P,0.05. GFP were also statistically tested at the individual level
using a Bonferroni corrected paired-test.
Brain source EEG analysis (Local Auto-Regressive
Average, LAURA). An intracranial brain source analysis was
calculated for each stable period of time (microstate) found
between 0 and 400 ms using the Local Auto-Regressive Average
(LAURA) model of the unknown current density in the brain [48].
LAURA was implemented using a lead field (solution space)
calculated on a realistic head model including 3005 solution points
selected from a 66666 mm grid equally distributed within the
gray matter. Source estimations were rendered on the MNI/
McGill average standard brain as supplied by Cartool. Then
transformation between the MNI coordinate system and that of
Talairach and Tournoux was performed with Cartool.
Supporting Information
Supporting Information S1
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006962.s001 (0.04 MB
DOC)
Figure S1 Electrical Neuroimaging results at T0. High-density
EEG neuroimaging, combining brain microstate analysis with
LAURA distributed linear source localizations at movie onset (T0;
A), revealed archetypal VEPs components (e.g., C1, P1 and N1).
The topographic pattern analysis of the global field power (B)
identified three selective time periods of stable topography (C) in
the across the collective 300 ms post-stimulus period from the two
conditions of interest (new in black vs. repeated in red). All
topographies are shown with the nasion upward and left scalp
leftward. Intracranial brain generators as estimated with LAURA
inverse solution over this period of time revealed a bilateral
occipito-temporal activity as shown on axial plane.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006962.s002 (9.70 MB
DOC)
Figure S2 Electrical Neuroimaging results at T1 for new objects
(A) and repeated objects (B). High-density EEG neuroimaging,
combining brain microstate analysis with LAURA distributed
linear source localizations applied at T1 (i.e., at the moment of
hand-object interaction), revealed seven time periods of stability:
Map 1: 0–30 ms; Map 2: 32–60 ms; Map 3: 62–80 ms; Map 4:
82–120 ms; Map 5: 122–150 ms; Map 6: 152–320 ms; Map 7:
322–400 ms. Three topographies (Maps 3–5) were significantly
present in the novel objects condition only. Here, maps are
represented on top of schematic representation of global field
power. All topographies are shown with the nasion upward and
left scalp leftward. LAURA source estimations of this brain
topography demonstrated similarities between our VEP and fMRI
data by showing a dominant anterior cingulate activation for Map
3 (local maximum: 3, 41, 29; x, y, z mm Talairach coordinates); a
dominant right-lateralized activation in the right STS region and
right aIPS (local maximum: 57, 211, 25; x, y, z mm Talairach
coordinates) for Map 4; and a right-lateralized activation including
right IFG and medial FG (local maximum: 46, 14, 25; x, y, z mm
Talairach coordinates) for Map 5. Map 3’s temporal window (62–
80 ms after hand-object interaction) was also characterized by a
significant difference of GFP between new objects and repeated
objects. Group-averaged data revealed a GFP peak at 64 ms for
new objects, although GFP for repeated objects was almost
extinguished at the same time period. Between 80–150 ms post
hand-object interaction, no significant difference was observed in
terms of GFP. Interestingly, after 150 ms post hand-object
interaction, the reverse pattern (greater GFP for repeated objects
than suppressed objects) was observed. The reliability of this
microstate at the group-averaged level was confirmed at the
individual level using a Bonferroni corrected paired Ttest on GFP
(P,0.05). Here, activations are represented on axial cross sections.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006962.s003 (8.26 MB
DOC)
Table S1 All ANOVAs had a level of significance set to 0.05.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006962.s004 (0.04 MB
DOC)
Decoding Other’s Intentions
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 September 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 9 | e6962Table S2 Local maxima, with a Z values greater than 3 in each
cluster, are provided in the table. Cluster size is in voxels. When
the cluster encompasses more than one anatomical location, the
localization given corresponds to the local maxima with the
highest value. P,0.001 uncorrected.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006962.s005 (0.03 MB
DOC)
Table S3 Local maxima (in Talairach coordinates) of periods of
brain stability (i.e., microstates) are provided in the table. Asterisk
indicates the time period that is significantly present in the novel
object condition in comparison with the repeated object condition.
P,0.05.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006962.s006 (0.04 MB
DOC)
Video S1 Example of one of our stimuli. This video 1 shows a
hand grasping a hairdryer to transport it.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006962.s007 (0.03 MB
AVI)
Video S2 Other example of our stimuli. This video shows one
hand grasping a hairdryer to use it.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006962.s008 (0.04 MB
AVI)
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